ANNA LERIMA PATULA vs. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
Facts:
·
Petitioner was charged of estafa, for being then a
saleswoman of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc., Dumaguete City, having
collected and received the total sum of ₱131,286.97 from several customers of
said company under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the
sales and deliver the collection to the said company, but far from complying
with her obligation and after a reasonable period of time despite repeated
demands therefore, and with intent to defraud the said company, did, then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously fail to deliver the said collection
to the said company but instead, did, then and there willfully unlawfully and
feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert the proceeds of the sale to
her own use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said company in the
aforesaid amount of ₱131,286.97.
·
Petitioner pled not guilty to the offense charged in
the information. At pre-trial, no stipulation of facts was had, and petitioner
did not avail herself of plea bargaining.
·
Issue:
Ruling:
To
elucidate why the Prosecution’s hearsay evidence was unreliable and
untrustworthy, and thus devoid of probative value, reference is made toSection
36 of Rule 130, Rules of Court, a rule that states that a witness can testify
only to those facts that she knows of her personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from her own perception, except as otherwise provided in the Rules
of Court. The personal knowledge of a witness is a substantive prerequisite for
accepting testimonial evidence that establishes the truth of a disputed fact. A
witness bereft ofpersonal knowledge of the disputed fact cannot be called upon
for that purpose because her testimony derives its value not from the credit
accorded to her as a witness presently testifying but from the veracity and
competency of the extrajudicial source of her information.
In
case a witness is permitted to testify based on what she has heard another
person say about the facts in dispute, the person from whom the witness derived
the information on the facts in dispute is not in court and under oath to be
examined and cross-examined. The weight of such testimony thendepends not upon
theveracity of the witness but upon the veracity of the other person giving the
information to the witness without oath. The information cannot be tested
because the declarant is not standing in court as a witness andcannot,
therefore, be cross-examined.
It
is apparent, too, that a person who relates a hearsay is not obliged to enter
into any particular, to answer any question, to solve any difficulties, to
reconcile any contradictions, to explain any obscurities, to remove any
ambiguities; and that she entrenches herself in the simple assertion that she
was told so, and leaves the burden entirely upon the dead or absent author.19 Thus, the rule
against hearsay testimony rests mainly on the ground that there was no
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.20 The testimony may
have been given under oath and before a court of justice, but if it is offered
against a party who is afforded no opportunity to cross-examine the witness, it
is hearsay just the same.21
Moreover,
the theory of the hearsay rule is that when a human utterance is offered as
evidence of the truth of the fact asserted, the credit of the assertor becomes
the basis of inference, and, therefore, the assertion can be received as
evidence only when made on the witness stand, subject to the test of
cross-examination. However, if an extrajudicial utterance is offered, not as an
assertion to prove the matter asserted but without reference to the truth of
the matter asserted, the hearsay rule does not apply. For example, in a slander
case, if a prosecution witness testifies that he heard the accused say that the
complainant was a thief, this testimony is admissible not to prove that the
complainant was really a thief, but merely to show that the accused uttered
those words.22 This kind of
utterance ishearsay in character but is not legal hearsay.23 The distinction is,
therefore, between (a) the fact that the statement was made, to which the
hearsay rule does not apply, and (b) the truth of the facts asserted in the
statement, to which the hearsay rule applies.24
Section
36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is understandably not the only rule that
explains why testimony that is hearsay should be excluded from consideration.
Excluding hearsay also aims to preserve the right of the opposing party to
cross-examine the original declarant claiming to have a direct knowledge of the
transaction or occurrence. If
hearsay is allowed, the right stands to be denied because the declarant is not
in court. It is then to be
stressed that the right to cross-examine the adverse party’s witness,
being
the only means of testing the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies,
is essential to the administration of justice.
To
address the problem of controlling inadmissible hearsay as evidence to
establish the truth in a dispute while also safe guardinga party’s right to
cross-examine her adversary’s witness,the Rules of Court offers two solutions.
The first solution is to require that all the witnesses in a judicial trial or
hearing be examined only in court under oath or affirmation. Section 1, Rule 132
of the Rules of Court formalizes this solution,viz:
Section
1. Examination to be done in open court. - The examination of
witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and
under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak, or the
question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the witness shall
be given orally. (1a)
The
second solution is to require that all witnesses be subject to the
cross-examination by the adverse party. Section 6, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court ensures this solution thusly:
Section
6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. – Upon the
termination of the direct examination, the witness may be cross-examined by the
adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected
therewith, with sufficient fullness and freedom to test his accuracy and
truthfulness and freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit
all important facts bearing upon the issue. (8a)
Although
the second solution traces its existence to a Constitutional precept relevant
to criminal cases, i.e., Section 14, (2), Article III, of the 1987
Constitution,which guarantees that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall xxx enjoy the right xxx to meet the witnesses face to face xxx,"
the rule requiring the cross-examination by the adverse party equally applies
to non-criminal proceedings.
We
thus stress that the rule excluding hearsay as evidence is based upon serious
concerns about the trustworthiness and reliability of hearsay evidence due to
its not being given under oath or solemn affirmation and due to its not being
subjected to cross-examination by the opposing counsel to test the perception,
memory, veracity and articulateness of the out-of-court declarant or actor upon
whose reliability the worth of the out-of-court statement depends.27
Based
on the foregoing considerations, Guivencan’s testimony as well as Exhibits B to
YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, must be entirely rejected as proof of
petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion.
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