GAJUDO v. TRADERS ROYAL
BANKG.R. No. 151098 March 21, 2006PANGANIBAN, CJ:
Civil Procedure: Effect of Failure to Plead
The
mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not automatically
result in the grant of the prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the latter must
still present the same quantum of evidence that would be required if the
defendant were still present. A party that defaults is not deprived of its
rights, except the right to be heard and to present evidence to the trial
court. If the evidence presented does not support a judgment for the
plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant may not
have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing evidence.
Facts:
Petitioners filed a
complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 90, against Traders
Royal Bank, the City Sheriff of Quezon City and the Register of Deeds of Quezon
City. The complaint sought the annulment of the extra-judicial foreclosure and
auction sale made by the]city sheriff of Quezon City of a parcel of
land covered by TCT No. 16711 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City, the
conventional redemption thereof, and prayed for damages and the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction.
On 11 June 1990,
petitioners re-filed the complaint with the same Court the amended complaint
substantially reproduced the allegations of the original complaint
Summons was served on
respondent bank. Supposing that all the defendants had filed their answer, a
motion to set case for pre-trial, which motion was, however, denied by the
Trial Court in its Order on the ground that respondent bank has not yet filed
its answer. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, thereunder
alleging that they received by registered mail, on 19 October 1990, a copy of
[respondent] banks answer with counterclaim, dated 04 October 1990, which copy
was attached to the motion. In its Order of 14 November 1991, the
trial Court denied for lack of merit, the motion for reconsideration, therein
holding that the answer with counterclaim filed by [respondent] bank referred
to another civil case pending before Branch 90 of the same Court.
For this reason, petitioner
a motion to declare respondent bank in default, thereunder alleging that no
answer has been filed despite the service of summons.
Issue:
Whether
or not the Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to apply the provisions
of Section 3, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [and in applying
instead] the rule on preponderance of evidence under Section 1, Rule 133 of the
Rules of Court.
Held:
The
Petition has no merit.
Between
the two rules, there is no incompatibility that would preclude the application
of either one of them. To begin with, Section 3 of Rule 9 governs the
procedure which the trial court is directed to take when a defendant fails to
file an answer. According to this provision, the court shall proceed to
render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant,
subject to the courts discretion on whether to require the presentation of
evidence ex parte. The same provision also sets down guidelines on
the nature and extent of the relief that may be granted. In particular,
the courts judgment shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind from
that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages.
X X X
Regarding
judgments by default, it was explained in Pascua v. Florendothat complainants are not
automatically entitled to the relief prayed for, once the defendants are declared
in default. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court has
ascertained that the relief is warranted by the evidence offered and the facts
proven by the presenting party. In Pascua, this Court ruled
that x x x it would be meaningless to require presentation of evidence if
every time the other party is declared in default, a decision would
automatically be rendered in favor of the non-defaulting party and exactly
according to the tenor of his prayer. This is not contemplated by the Rules nor
is it sanctioned by the due process clause.
X X
X
In
sum, while petitioners were allowed to present evidence ex
parte under Section 3 of Rule 9, they were not excused from establishing
their claims for damages by the required quantum of proof under Section 1 of
Rule 133. Stated differently, any advantage they may have gained from
the ex parte presentation of evidence does not lower the degree of
proof required. Clearly then, there is no incompatibility between the two
rules.
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