G.R. No. L-32162 September 28, 1984THE PASAY CITY GOVERNMENT vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA,
MAKASIAR, J.,
Civil Procedure: Rule 10
Facts:
·
Respondent-appellee V.D. Isip, Sons & Associates
represented by Vicente David Isip entered into a contract with the City of
Pasay represented by the then Mayor Pablo Cuneta. The contract entitled
"Contract and Agreement" was for the construction of a new Pasay City
Hall.
·
In the demands for payment .the petitioner-appellants failed
to remit to the respondent-appellee. Subsequently, respondent appellee filed an
action for specific performance with damages against herein
petitioners-appellants before the respondent Court.
·
Appellants filed a motion for the amendment of the complaint
and for bin of particulars. Denied by the Court.
·
Appellants filed a motion for the amendment of the complaint
and for bin of particulars. Denied by the Court.
·
The parties arrived at a draft of amicable agreement. On
February 25, 1969, the Municipal Board of Pasay enacted an ordinance which
approved the Compromise Agreement
Issue:
Whether or not the Court
erred in entertaining the supplemental pleading filed by the
respondent-appellee.
Held:
Yes, Having established that
the compromise agreement was final and immediately executory, and in fact was
already enforced, the respondent Court was in error when it still entertained
the supplemental complaint filed by the respondent-appellee for by then the
respondent Court had no more jurisdiction over the subject matter. When a
decision has become final and executory, the court no longer has the power and
jurisdiction to alter, amend or revoke, and its only power thereof is to order
its execution
After the perfection of an
appeal, the trial court loses jurisdiction over its judgment and cannot vacate
the same.
Moreover, supplemental pleadings are meant to
supply deficiencies in aid of original pleading, not to entirely substitute the
latter Here, the respondent-appellee originally asked for specific performance
which was later settled through a compromise agreement. After this, the
respondent-appellee asked for rescission of both the contract and agreement and
the compromise agreement using a supplemental complaint. It is clear that the
supplemental complaint We have before Us is not only to "supply
deficiencies in aid of original pleading but is also meant as an entirely new
"substitute" to the latter. A supplemental complaint must be
consistent with and in aid of, the cause of action set forth in the original
complaint and a new and independent cause of action cannot be set up by such
complaint
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