JUAN A. GOCHANGCO,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
vs.
THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL,
G.R. No. L-49396 January 15,
1988
NARVASA, J.:
Facts:
Hodges sought the ejectment from certain parcels of land in
Bacolod City titled in his name, of several persons, namely: Basilicio Macanan,
Gertrude Nolan, Alejandro Santiago, Jr., Sy Ho, and Milagros Minoria.
Macanan, Nolan and Santiago were duly served with summons.
Macanan died afterwards, and since his heirs could not be located, and hence
could not be substituted in his place, the case against him was eventually
dismissed without prejudice. Santiago
and Nolan voluntarily vacated the premises; so, the case was also dismissed as
against them.
Summons was also duly served on Minoria. Although she refused
to acknowledge such service, she subsequently filed an answer to the complaint,
thru counsel.
Sy Ho also appears to have been served with summons, service
being evidenced, it is claimed, by the return to this effect of the Provincial
Sheriff. But,
as, will shortly be recounted, Sy Ho would later deny such service.
Plaintiff Hodges died during the pendency of the ejectment
suit; and on August 20,1964, the court-appointed Administrator of his estate,
the Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank (PCIB), was substituted as party
plaintiff. PCIB
thereafter filed a motion to declare Sy Ho in default for failure to answer the
complaint. This was granted.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners must be considered default for
his failure to submit evidence on the clerk of court not by the judge.
Held:
The underlying philosophy of the doctrine of default is that
the defendant's failure to answer the complaint despite receiving copy thereof
together with summons, is attributable to one of two causes: either (a) to his
realization that he has no defenses to the plaintiffs cause and hence resolves
not to oppose the complaint, or, (b) having good defenses to the suit, to
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence which prevented him from
seasonably filing an answer setting forth those defenses,. It
does make sense for a defendant without defenses, and who accepts the
correctness of the specific relief prayed for in the
complaint, to forego the filing of the answer or any sort of intervention in
the action at all. For even if he did intervene, the result would be the same:
since he would be unable to establish any good defense, having none in fact,
judgment would inevitably go against him. And this would be an acceptable
result, if not being in his power to alter or prevent it, provided that the
judgment did not go beyond or differ from the specific relief stated
in the complaint. It
would moreover spare him from the embarrassment of openly appearing to defend
the indefensible. On the other hand, if he did have good defenses, it would be
unnatural for him not to set them up properly and timely, and if he did not in
fact set them up, it must be presumed that some insuperable cause prevented him
from doing so: fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence. In this event,
the law will grant him relief, and the law is in truth quite liberal in the
reliefs made available to him: a motion to set aside the order of default prior
to judgment; a
motion for new trial to set aside the default judgment; an
appeal from the judgment by default even if no motion to set aside the order of
default or motion for new trial had been previously presented; a
special civil action for certiorari impugning the court's
jurisdiction.
A defendant in default is not and should not be placed in a
situation more favorable than a defendant who has answered but who fails to
appear for trial despite notice. In the latter case, as in the former, the
trial may proceed ex parte, but
is not invalidated by the fact merely that reception of evidence had been
undertaken by the clerk of court on the Court's instructions; this, despite the
fact that the judgment that may be rendered on the basis of such an ex
parte trial may award reliefs exceeding the amount or different from
that, prayed for in the complaint, unlike a judgment by default which cannot
differ from or go beyond what is set down in the prayer of the complaint.
It was therefore error for the Court a quo to
have declared the judgment by default to be fatally flawed by the fact that the
plaintiffs evidence had been received not by the Judge himself but by the clerk
of court.
One last word. The City Court and City Sheriff were impleaded
as parties petitioners in the petition at bar. This is incorrect. They are not
proper parties. They do not have — and should not have — any interest in the
subject of the instant proceedings, either in obtaining any relief in respect
thereto of any nature whatsoever, or in the success of the petitioner. Only Gochangco
is the proper party petitioner.
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